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Lease Capitalization, Financial Agreements and EBITDA  
 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
EBITDA, earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization, is used by many firms 
as a measure of performance in financial covenants and incentive compensation agreements. 
In 2009, when the FASB, in conjunction with the IASB, likely begins requiring firms to report 
virtually all leases as capital leases, we expect calculated measures of EBITDA to increase. As 
a result, firms may find unexpected slack in financial covenants and increases in incentive 
compensation that are unrelated to real improvements in performance.  In anticipation of the 
change in accounting for leases, companies will want to revise contracts that employ EBITDA 
to ensure that unanticipated consequences are avoided.  
This research report examines the effects of lease capitalization on EBITDA in cases where it 
is employed in financial agreements.  Our focus is on companies noted to employ EBITDA in 
financial covenants or incentive compensation agreements with significant exposure to 
operating leases. For a sample of 25 companies we recalculated EBITDA, treating operating 
leases as though they were capital-lease commitments.  For some firms, we found significant 
increases in EBITDA, with a sample-wide median increase of 7.7%                           Nov. 2007
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our own, have an important role to play in providing information to market participants.   
 
Because our Lab is housed within a university, all of our research reports have an 
educational quality, as they are designed to impart knowledge and understanding to those 
who read them.  Our focus is on issues that we believe will be of interest to a large 
segment of stock market participants. Depending on the issue, we may focus our attention 
on individual companies, groups of companies, or on large segments of the market at 
large.   
 
A recurring theme in our work is the identification of reporting practices that give 
investors a misleading signal, whether positive or negative, of corporate earning power. 
We define earning power as the ability to generate a sustainable stream of earnings that is 
backed by cash flow. Accordingly, our research may look into reporting practices that 
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prices generally, though from a fundamental and not technical point of view.  
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Companies Named in this Report 
Company         Page 
24/7 Real Media Inc.         5, 6, 8, 9 
American Greetings Corp.        4, 5, 9 
Arcadia Resources, Inc.        9 
Bausch & Lomb, Inc.        9 
Biogen idec, Inc.         9 
Blackbaud, Inc.         9 
Bowater, Inc.          9 
CKE Restaurants, Inc.        9 
Consol Energy, Inc.         9 
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Eagle Materials, Inc.                      8, 9 
Gilman & Ciocia, Inc.        5, 6, 8, 9 
Handleman co /mi         9 
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Lions Gate Entertainment       9 
Live Nation, Inc.         9 
Martin Marietta Materials, Inc.       4, 5, 8, 9 
Mentor Corp.         9 
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Mylan Laboratories, Inc.        8, 9 
Nci Building Systems, Inc.        9 
Reynolds American, Inc.        9 
Sears Holdings Corp.        7, 9 
Spx Corp.         9 
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Verifone Holdings, Inc.        9 
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Lease Capitalization, Financial Agreements and EBITDA 
Introduction 
Off-balance-sheet financing in the form of operating leases has been a concern for 
financial analysts for some time.   Recently, the FASB announced a project to reconsider 
lease accounting1. The project will be an international effort composed of FASB and 
IASB members. A discussion paper is expected in 2008 with a final document expected 
in 2009. Early indications are that when these new guidelines become effective, virtually 
all leases will be reported as capital leases, that is, on the financial statements. 
An earlier research report published by the Georgia Tech Financial Analysis Lab, The 
Effects of Lease Capitalization on Various Financial Measures:  An Analysis of the Retail 
Industry, dated June, 2007, discussed the effects on key measures of performance and 
financial position of bringing onto the financial statements operating leases that are 
presently accounted for off-balance sheet. In the report we noted that EBITDA, or 
earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization, actually increased with 
lease capitalization. At times the increases were quite dramatic.  We surmised that such 
increases in EBITDA could have important effects on contracts that employ EBITDA, 
such as financial covenants and compensation agreements.  Increases in EBITDA may 
force lenders to revise financial covenants and compensation committees or to revisit 
incentive compensation agreements currently in place with management personnel.   
This research report examines more closely the effects of lease capitalization on EBITDA 
in cases where it is employed in financial agreements.  Our focus is on companies noted 
to employ EBITDA in financial covenants or incentive compensation agreements with 
significant exposure to operating leases.  
 
 
Financial Covenants and EBITDA 
 
Because it is useful in assessing debt service capacity, EBITDA is often used in financial 
covenants. Two companies that are evaluated using EBITDA are American Greetings 
Corp. and Martin Marietta Materials, Inc. 
 
American Greetings Corp. 
As reported by the company: 
 
EBITDA is presented in the earnings release because management believes that it is 
of interest to its investors and lenders in relation to its debt covenants, as certain of 
the debt covenants include EBITDA as a component of a covenant calculation.2 
 
                                                 
1 FASB Formally Adds Project to Reconsider Lease Accounting,  July 19, 2006, 
www.fasb.org/news/nr071906.shtml.  
2 Source: American Greetings Corporation, Form 8-K Report to the Securities and Exchange Commission, 
April 3, 2003, p. 1. 
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Martin Marietta Materials, Inc. 
As reported by the company:  
 
 Consolidated Debt-to-Consolidated EBITDA is calculated as total long-term debt 
 divided by Consolidated EBITDA, as defined, for the trailing twelve months. 
 Consolidated EBITDA is generally defined as earnings before interest expense, 
 income tax expense, and depreciation, depletion and amortization expense for 
 continuing operations. Additionally, stock-based compensation expense is added back 
 and interest income is deducted in the calculation of Consolidated EBITDA. Certain 
 other nonrecurring items and noncash items, if they occur, can affect the calculation 
 of Consolidated EBITDA. The Corporation presents this ratio, as it is a covenant 
 within the Corporation's $250,000,000 five-year revolving credit agreement. Under 
 the agreement, the Corporation's ratio of Consolidated Debt-to-Consolidated 
 EBITDA, as defined, for the trailing twelve months cannot exceed 2.75 to 1.00 as of 
 the end of any fiscal quarter.1  
 
As seen in the American Greetings Corp. and Martin Marietta Materials, Inc. examples 
above, EBITDA is used as an important financial measure in financial covenants.  
Because it is measured before interest expense and income taxes, EBITDA is a measure 
of earnings that is available to service debt, especially interest expense on debt.  An 
increase in EBITDA due to a change in accounting for operating leases could give a 
subject company more financial flexibility within its financial covenants in the absence of 
an actual improvement in financial performance. With improvements in measured 
performance relative to financial covenants, a company may be better able to avoid debt 
default or even find itself in an improved bargaining position with respect to terms on its 
debt agreements or for purposes of raising debt levels. Certainly, lenders will want to 
revisit and revise financial covenants to neutralize these accounting effects.    
 
 
Incentive Compensation Agreements and EBITDA 
 
Because it is a performance measure, EBITDA is also used in incentive compensation 
agreements. Two examples of companies that use EBITDA in their incentive 
compensation agreements are 24/7 Real Media, Inc. and Gilman and Ciocia, Inc.   
 
24/7 Real Media, Inc.  
As reported by the company: 
 
 The Compensation Committee set the performance targets in three categories, 
revenue, gross profit and EBITDA (earnings before income, taxes, depreciation and 
amortization).  The target bonus and target short-term restricted stock and stock 
options grants are based on the Company's achieving the performance target in each 
of the three categories.  For each of the revenue, gross profit and EBITDA 
                                                 
1 Source: Martin Marietta Materials, Inc., Form 8-K Report to the Securities and Exchange Commission, 
May 8, 2007, Ex-99.2. 
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components of incentive compensation, the named executive officers will be entitled 
to one-third of 100% of such target incentive compensation if the Company achieves 
100% of the target component.  Named executive officers may receive pro rata 
reductions in the levels of incentive compensation.  For example, if the Company 
achieves 90% of the targeted revenue, 80% of the targeted gross profit and 100% of 
targeted EBITDA, executives would receive one-third of 90% of target incentive 
compensation for the revenue component, one-third of 80% of target incentive 
compensation for the gross profit component and one-third of 100% of incentive 
compensation for the EBITDA component.  With respect to the EBITDA component, 
however, the Company's actual EBITDA must be at least 80% of the target EBITDA, 
or the named executive officers will not earn any incentive compensation under the 
EBITDA component.  If the Company exceeds 100% of a target component, any 
increases in named executive officer incentive compensation shall be at the discretion 
of the Compensation Committee.1  
 
 
Gilman & Ciocia, Inc.   
As reported by the company:  
 
 Incentive compensation for each Named Executive Officer will be determined one-
 third (1/3) based upon the Company's EBIDTA budget for the fiscal year, and two-
 thirds (2/3) based upon criteria to be established by the Chief Executive Officer. The 
 Named Executive Officer must be employed by the Company on the date that the 
 incentive compensation is paid in order to receive the incentive compensation. 
 Incentive compensation will not be paid to a Named Executive Officer who quits or 
 who is terminated with cause prior to the date of payment. Incentive compensation 
 will be paid to a Named Executive Officer who is terminated on other grounds, 
 including a Named Executive Officer who quits with good reason.2  
 The EBITDA component of the incentive compensation will be computed ranging 
 from 10% of base salary to 40% of base salary if actual EBITDA results for a fiscal 
 year exceed at least 85% of the EBITDA budgeted for such fiscal year.  
In the 24/7 Real Media, Inc. and Gilman & Ciocia, Inc. examples above, one can easily 
visualize how a change in the measurement of EBITDA can very directly impact 
incentive compensation.  EBITDA is used in compensation agreements as a measure of 
corporate financial performance.  The idea is that incentive compensation should be 
raised when management efforts lead to improved financial performance.  When 
measures of performance are increased not because of real improvements but due to 
accounting changes, increases in incentive compensation are not warranted. 
Compensation committees will want to reconsider and revise incentive compensation 
schemes to address these accounting effects.   
                                                 
1 Source: 24/7 Real Media Inc., Form 8-K Filing Report to the Securities and Exchange Commission, 
November 21, 2005, p. 2. 
2 Source: Gilman & Ciocia, Inc., Form 8-K Filing Report to the Securities and Exchange Commission, 
September 8, 2007, p. 2. 
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The Effects of Lease Capitalization on EBITDA 
 
We looked at the effects on EBITDA of capitalizing our sample firms’ operating leases.  
More specifically, we measured reported EBITDA as follows: 
 
Reported EBITDA = Income from Continuing Operations + Income Tax Expense + 
Interest Expense + Depreciation and Amortization Expense.  
 
The capitalization of operating leases replaces rent expense on the operating leases with 
interest expense on the underlying capital lease obligations and amortization expense on 
the capitalized lease assets.  Accordingly, under lease capitalization, rent expense is 
reduced (actually eliminated) and interest expense and amortization expense are 
increased.  However, EBITDA is measured before interest expense and amortization 
expense.  Thus, any increase in these expense captions, interest expense and amortization 
expense, do not serve to reduce EBITDA.  As a result, EBITDA with lease capitalization 
is greater than EBITDA measured under operating lease treatment by the amount of rent 
expense.  Stated more directly, Revised EBITDA can be calculated as follows:  
 
Revised EBITDA = Reported EBITDA + Rent Expense. 
 
In summary, we expect Revised EBITDA to exceed Reported EBITDA by the amount of 
rent expense.  
 
It should be emphasized that EBITDA is not a GAAP measure.  As such, there are no 
specific guidelines on how EBITDA is to be calculated.  Nonetheless, our so-called 
Reported EBITDA is calculated using an approach that we find to be used most often in 
practice.1  
 
For a closer look at our calculations of Revised EBITDA, consider the calculations for 
Sears Holdings Corp. presented below.  For the year ended February 3, 2007 the 
company reported income from continuing operations of $1,490,000,000.  To this amount 
we added back income tax expense of $930,000,000, interest expense of $337,000,000 
and depreciation and amortization of $1,142,000,000 to get the Reported EBITDA of 
$3,899,000,000. We then added back rent expense of $887,000,000 to Reported EBITDA 
to get Revised EBITDA of $4,786,000,000.  The addition of Rent Expense to Reported 








                                                 
1 Some analysts would adjust EBITDA for nonrecurring items.  Given the subjective nature of what items 
of income or expense are nonrecurring, we did not adjust for them.     
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Calculation of Reported and Revised EBITDA 
Sears Holdings Corp., Year ended Feb. 3, 2007 (Dollars in thousands) 
Net Income from continuing operations $1,490,000
Income tax Expense  +   930,000
Interest expense +   337,000
Depreciation and amortization + 1,142,000
Reported EBITDA    3,899,000
Rent Expense + 845,000
Revised EBITDA $4,744,000




We searched public filings to identify examples of firms where EBITDA was used as a 
metric in financial covenants or incentive compensation agreements.  Our focus was on 
firms with a market capitalization of $1 billion or greater.  However, we did include in 
our sample a limited number of smaller firms.  While the sample was not scientifically 
selected, we do think that it offers a representative set of cases where EBITDA was 
employed in financial decision making.   
 
Our results are provided in Table 1.  For each company, we present our Reported 
EBITDA, rent expense, Revised EBITDA and the percent change in Revised vs. 
Reported EBITDA.  As noted in the Table, the median increase in EBITDA for the entire 
sample was 7.7%.  However, individual company results varied greatly, ranging from less 
than 1% for Eagle Materials, Inc. and Mylan Laboratories, Inc. to as much as 87% for 
24/7 Real Media, Inc. and 76% for Gilman & Ciocia, Inc.   
 
To Apply the Revised EBITDA figures to two of the previously-mentioned focus 
companies, consider Martin Marietta Materials, Inc. and 24/7 Real Media, Inc.  In the 
case of Martin Marietta Materials, the company’s financial covenants indicate that the 
firm’s consolidated debt-to-consolidated EBITDA for the trailing twelve months cannot 
exceed 2.75. On the 2006 balance sheet, short- and long-term borrowings total 
$705,264,000.  For the year ended 2006, Reported EBITDA totals $540,670,000.  Using 
these figures, the ratio of consolidated debt to consolidated EBITDA is 1.30, well within 
the covenant requirements.  Employing Revised EBITDA of $612,918,000, the ratio 
improves (i.e., declines) to 1.15.  While the company indicates that there may be 
adjustments to the measure of consolidated debt-to-EBITDA for which we have no 
details, for example, for the effects of certain acquisitions, it is clear that the measure 
does improve when Revised EBITDA is employed in its calculation.   
 
For 24/7 Real Media, Inc., a named executive is entitled to one-third of 100% of a target 
incentive compensation amount if the Company achieves 100% of its target measure of 
EBITDA. While the company did not disclose target EBITDA, an 87.06% increase in 
EBITDA caused by a change in the accounting for operating leases would improve the 
probability that the company would reach its target.   
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Table 1. Effects of Capitalizing Operating Leases on EBITDA, Fiscal Year 2006 
(Dollars in thousands) 
 
Company Name Fiscal Year1 
EBITDA 
Ref.2 








24/7 REAL MEDIA INC. 12/31/06 2 -$3,331 $2,900 -$431 87.06%
AMERICAN GREETINGS CORP. 02/28/07 1 $153,727 $55,302 $209,029 35.97%
ARCADIA RESOURCES, INC. 03/31/07 2 -$32,896 $2,463 -$30,433 7.49%
BAUSCH & LOMB, INC. 12/30/06 1 $271,400 $33,200 $304,600 12.23%
BIOGEN IDEC, INC.  12/31/06 1 $868,904 $26,200 $895,104 3.02%
BLACKBAUD, INC.  12/31/06 1 $52,185 $2,586 $54,771 4.96%
BOWATER, INC.  12/31/06 1 $402,900 $8,500 $411,400 2.11%
CKE RESTAURANTS, INC.  01/29/07 1 $164,240 $65,002 $229,242 39.58%
CONSOL ENERGY, INC. 12/31/06 1 $872,223 $43,611 $915,834 5.00%
DRS TECHNOLOGIES, INC. 03/31/07 1 $383,739 $31,500 $415,239 8.21%
EAGLE MATERIALS, INC. 03/31/07 1 $349,757 $2,200 $351,957 0.63%
GILMAN & CIOCIA INC. 06/30/07 2 $2,617 $2,000 $4,617 76.44%
HANDLEMAN CO /MI 04/28/07 1 -$19,285 $9,206 -$10,079 47.74%
INPHONIC, INC. 12/31/06 1 -$43,829 $1,923 -$41,906 4.39%
LIONS GATE ENTERTAINMENT 03/31/07 2 $55,777 $4,400 $60,177 7.89%
MARTIN MARIETTA MATERIALS, INC.7 12/31/06 1 $540,670 $72,248 $612,918 13.36%
MENTOR CORP /MN 03/31/07 1 $98,043 $4,000 $102,043 4.08%
METALICO, INC. 12/31/06 1 $24,454 $1,181 $25,635 4.83%
MYLAN LABORATORIES, INC. 03/31/07 1 $539,089 $3,944 $543,033 0.73%
NCI BUILDING SYSTEMS INC. 10/29/06 1 $175,036 $11,900 $186,936 6.80%
REYNOLDS AMERICAN, INC.  12/31/06 1 $2,241,000 $24,000 $2,265,000 1.07%
SEARS HOLDINGS CORP 02/03/07 2 $3,899,000 $845,000 $4,744,000 21.67%
SPX CORP 12/31/06 1 $414,800 $42,500 $457,300 10.25%
STEINER LEISURE LTD  12/31/06 1 $58,594 $11,788 $70,382 20.12%
VERIFONE HOLDINGS, INC.  10/31/06 1 $121,692 $8,885 $130,577 7.30%
Mean Change (%)           17.2%






                                                 
1 Fiscal Year refers to date of Form 10-K annual filing to the Securities and Exchange Commission.  
2 EBITDA Ref. 1 refers to EBITDA used in calculating financial covenants.  EBITDA Ref.  2: refers to 
EBITDA used in calculating both financial covenants and incentive compensation. 
3 Reported EBITDA = Income from continuing operations + Income tax expense + Interest expense + 
Depreciation and amortization expense.  
4 Rent Expense is net of Sublease Rentals. 
5 Revised EBITDA = Reported EBITDA + Rent expense. 
6 %Change = (Revised EBITDA - Reported EBITDA)/Reported EBITDA. 
7 The company noted that in computing EBITDA, stock-based compensation is added back as an additional  
non-cash expense.   
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EBITDA is used by many firms as a measure of performance in financial covenants and 
incentive compensation agreements.  In 2009, when the FASB likely begins requiring 
firms to report virtually all leases as capital leases, we expect calculated measures of 
EBITDA to increase. As a result, firms may find unexpected slack in financial covenants 
and increases in incentive compensation that are unrelated to real improvements in 
performance.  In anticipation of the change in accounting for leases, companies will want 
to revise contracts that employ EBITDA to ensure that unanticipated consequences are 
avoided.  
 
Interestingly, many firms, especially commercial banks, employ EBITDAR or earnings 
before interest, taxes, depreciation, amortization and rent expense as a performance 
measure in financial covenants.  As EBITDAR is already measured before rent expense, 
it will not be impacted by the change in accounting for leases.  In the interim, as financial 
covenants and incentive compensation agreements are written and revised, firms may 
want to consider replacing EBITDA with EBITDAR in financial agreements.   
 
 
 
